Let's compare and contrast...leftwing member please weight in.

[WTF]

Originally Posted by oeb11

ftw - thank you for your usual nonsense - and 9500! -

Who is ftw?

Trump's got this!

[oeb11]

Thank you for your usual con-contributory nonsense - ftw!
Vote Bernie - and he will make the mean old stock market completely disappear.

[WTF]

Originally Posted by oeb11

- ftw!
.

Who is ftw?

[eccieuser9500]

Originally Posted by The_Waco_Kid

what an idiot yous is.



http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/05/25...ids/index.html



No refuge in Europe

When White moved to France in 1983 through a prestigious Guggenheim Fellowship for writing, he thought he was escaping this new disease, at least for a while. He liked Paris so much that he stayed there -- "with its drizzle, as cool, grey and luxurious as chinchilla," he writes in the autobiographical novel "The Farewell Symphony" -- beyond the year that he had planned.


But HIV began hitting the country in a big way. One of its early victims was French philosopher Michel Foucault, also gay, who invited White over for dinner a few times for rich meals without vegetables. When White brought up AIDS, Foucault laughed and accused him of being puritanical, calling it an "invented" disease "aimed just at gays to punish them for having unnatural sex." The esteemed thinker died of the disease in the summer of 1984.



"In Paris AIDS was dismissed as an American phobia until French people started dying; then everyone said, 'Well, you have to die some way or another.' If Americans were hysterical and pragmatic, the French were fatalistic, depressed but determined to keep the party going," White writes in "The Farewell Symphony."



your point is .. what?????


Reagan bad? France bad? fags bad?



the early cocktails of drugs they threw at the issue killed more than they helped. butt those butt fucker faggots were the guinea pigs that had to be sacrificed to fix the fag disease .. right?

Whataboutism.

[dilbert firestorm]

sometimes.. what about ism has a point....

[The_Waco_Kid]

Originally Posted by eccieuser9500

Whataboutism.

Originally Posted by dilbert firestorm

sometimes.. what about ism has a point....

indeed it does!

[HoeHummer]

What abouts when it doesn’t, titfucker?

[bb1961]

Originally Posted by WTF

Who is ftw?

Did you learn this in Kindergarten or grammar school...
I see you, ASSWIPE and 9.5k don't know the meaning of...compare and contrast.

[dilbert firestorm]

Originally Posted by HoeHummer

What abouts when it doesn’t, titfucker?

you are a great example of whataboutism!!!

[Munchmasterman]

Liars lie. Which you did right off the bat.

The pandemic was declared in June, not April 2009.

Where was the concern in 2009?
You make the sweeping and ignorant statement about H1N1 concern with no information whatsoever.
You were a member of ECCIE in the 1st year of the H1F1 epidemic......but you didn't post anything until 2017. There was no concern mentioned on your part.

Compare and contrast?
To the info in your link?

Here is a much better link.

https://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm#top

Compare and contrast?

Pence is the official info outlet. A non-scientific bottleneck. That is a political response, not a scientific response.

In 2009, the response is detailed in a section I included from the link below.

In 2009, CDC, WHO, and other scientific orgs kept us informed.
In 2020, trump (a non-scientific moron at best) is trying to get re-elected. Enough said.

The first case was identified on Apr. 15, 2009.

"On September 15, 2009, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced its approval of four 2009 H1N1 influenza vaccinesExternal Web Site Icon, and later, on November 16, FDA announced its approval of a fifth 2009 H1N1 vaccineExternal Web Site Icon to protect against the 2009 H1N1 flu virus."

And it doesn't matter when Obama declared anything. His was a status change, not an increase in threat.
Obama wasn't talking over or contradicting CDC or WHO.
WHO declared a pandemic 2 months after the FIRST case was discovered.

The linked article is long and includes lots of details trumpys ignore.
The devil is in the details.

"CDC Laboratories Bolster Nation’s Testing Capacity
While initial efforts were underway to develop a safe and effective vaccine to protect people against 2009 H1N1, work also was being done at CDC to help laboratories supporting health care professionals to more quickly identify the 2009 H1N1 virus in samples from patients. The real-time PCR test developed by CDC was cleared for use by diagnostic laboratories by FDA under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) on April 28, 2009, less than two weeks after identification of the new pandemic virus. Prior to the availability of this EUA, public health laboratories had been able to identify whether influenza A viruses were seasonal influenza viruses or were a novel strain, but the new diagnostic kits allowed labs to confirm a virus as 2009 H1N1. On May 1, 2009, CDC test kits began shipping to domestic and international public health laboratories. (Each test kit contained reagents to test 1,000 clinical specimens). From May 1 through September 1, 2009, more than 1,000 kits were shipped to 120 domestic and 250 international laboratories in 140 countries. Once labs had the test kits and verified that their testing was running properly, they were able to identify new cases more quickly than before and no longer needed to send samples to CDC for lab confirmation. The transition away from CDC lab confirmation testing didn’t happen overnight though - between April 23 and May 31, 2009, CDC influenza laboratory analyzed about 5,000 influenza virus samples, five times the number that were processed in a similar timeframe in 2008, and more than during any previous influenza season. By May 18, 2009, 40 states had been validated to conduct their own 2009 H1N1 testing, with eight states having multiple laboratories able to do their own testing. CDC alerted the public that the expansion in testing capacity would likely result in a jump in the number of 2009 H1N1 cases, but that this would actually present a more accurate picture of the true scope of 2009 H1N1 influenza in the United States"

"A Pandemic is Declared
On June 11, 2009, WHO signaled that a global pandemic of 2009 H1N1 influenza was underwayExternal Web Site Icon by further raising the worldwide pandemic alert level to Phase 6External Web Site IconExternal Web Site Icon. That day, CDC held its first press conference with the new CDC Director Thomas Frieden, MD, MPH. The press conference had a total of 2,355 participants. At the time, more than 70 countries had reported cases of 2009 H1N1 infection, and community level outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 were ongoing in multiple parts of the world. The WHO decision to raise the pandemic alert level to Phase 6 was a reflection of spread of the virus in other parts of the world and not a reflection of any change in the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus or associated illness. To date, most people in the United States who had become ill with 2009 H1N1 influenza had not become seriously ill and had recovered without hospitalization."

Here is an important section.


"CDC Communication Activities During the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
The CDC response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was led by science and continually evolved to meet the nation’s needs as events unfolded and as more information became available. However, a consistent underlying communications strategy underscored the entire CDC response. The strategy is based on the emergency risk communications principles of quickly, proactively and transparently communicating accurate information to the public and to partners. This strategy included CDC clearly stating its goals and actions in response to the evolving situation and acknowledging what was not known, as well as what was known. Another important part of the strategy was CDC setting the expectation that information and advice would change rapidly as the situation evolved. From the earliest days of the pandemic, CDC regularly articulated its goals to “reduce transmission and illness severity, and provide information to help health care providers, public health officials and the public address the challenges posed by the new virus.” Throughout the response, in an effort to provide the most helpful information in the most effective ways possible, CDC drew on existing knowledge but also worked with partners to conduct ongoing scientific research and evaluation of people’s knowledge, attitudes and practices related to a number of topics including 2009 H1N1 flu, infection control guidance, and vaccine.

Especially during the early days of the outbreak, the release of information from CDC and exchange of information with partners was conducted on a 24-hour cycle. This included frequent updates to media and the public, the consistent use of a core group of spokespersons, daily information outreach to partners, and rapid establishment and ongoing maintenance of an extensive Web site dedicated specifically to the emergency response for 2009 H1N1 flu. The goal was not only to be as transparent as possible in all activities related to managing the public health response, but also to maintain credibility and continue to be a trusted source of information for the public and for partners.

Beginning early in the response and continuing throughout the year and into 2010, special care was taken to keep state and local public health partners informed of CDC’s activities. Key messages were regularly provided to help maintain consistent, clear communication across the response. Special care also was taken to regularly collect feedback from state and local public health partners to help ensure that CDC recommendations were finely tuned to what was happening in the field. Regularly scheduled conference calls with the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, the National Association of City and County Health Officials, and the National Public Health Information Coalition proved to be an effective way to share information. In addition, on April 24, 2009, CDC held the first of more than 30 Clinician Outreach and Communication Activity (COCA) calls presented on a variety of 2009 H1N1-related topics. COCA is designed to reach a diverse group of health care providers and provide a system through which clinicians can communicate their educational needs to CDC and receive answers to questions about related emerging diseases. At the peak of the 2009 H1N1 response, COCA had more than 41,100 listserv subscribers.

CDC also worked hard to keep the policy community informed. CDC provided responses to congressional requests for information and briefings on 2009 H1N1-related issues, and also provided email and web-based informational updates as the pandemic unfolded. In all, CDC participated in 14 hearings, provided technical assistance in another 12 hearings, issued over three dozen 2009 H1N1 newsletters to policymakers, arranged for over 40 congressional briefings or speaking engagements and fielded over 350 congressional inquiries during the pandemic.

There was a concerted effort to get information out as soon as possible and to keep the public and partners aware of developments as they unfolded, even as guidance was changing quickly. For example, when relatively few cases of human infection with this virus were lab confirmed and severity of the pandemic was not known, on April 28, 2009, CDC posted guidance for schools and advised that they close if they had a suspected or actual case of the flu in order to lessen the risk of spreading 2009 H1N1 into their communities. As more information became available suggesting a lower risk of severe illness and death from 2009 H1N1, six days later the recommendation was changed to recommend against school closure for community mitigation purposes.

The development of CDC guidance is an example of the collaborative communication and sharing of information that took place between CDC, HHS, other federal agencies, and external partners. Development of appropriate guidance often relied on CDC communication with many external partners several times a week, with the goal of achieving consensus on what the best practice would be given the best science currently available. For example, CDC worked with representatives from a number of organizations including but not limited to Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE),External Web Site Icon National Association of County and City Health Officials (NAACHO), External Web Site IconAmerican Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)External Web Site Icon, American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)External Web Site Icon, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), External Web Site IconAssociation of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO)External Web Site Icon, American College of Physicians (ACP)External Web Site Icon, Infectious Diseases Society of America (ISDA)External Web Site Icon, American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)External Web Site Icon, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) External Web Site Iconand World Health Organization (WHO)External Web Site Icon, during the development of guidance related to everything from surveillance systems to the appropriate use of antiviral drugs during the pandemic. On the topic of vaccination, these discussions helped inform decision-making by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).

Apart from ongoing collaboration between CDC and its external partners, the communications response for 2009 H1N1 flu also was characterized by ongoing, close coordination between CDC’s communicators and its scientists to ensure that messages stayed scientifically accurate. Also, CDC communicators took time to regularly analyze feedback from a variety of external sources, including polls and surveys, in order to ensure that CDC's messages were clear.

CDC provided a steady stream of information to audiences across the spectrum: from the public to pharmacists to laboratorians to international partners and countries around the globe. Information provided by CDC reached a myriad of audiences through a variety of channels including but not limited to: a 24-hour information hotline, press briefings for the media, dissemination through health alert networks, daily postings (including video and audio podcasts) to the CDC 2009 H1N1 web site, regular updates on Facebook and Twitter, and further outreach by partners and partner organizations to their own audiences, just to name a few channels. For example, in November 2009, CDC kicked off a national travelers’ health public awareness campaign and urged travelers to plan ahead and stay informed about what to do if they got sick while they were away from home. The campaign used a variety of media, including informational posters distributed at over 300 ports of entry in the United States, national radio and print advertising, and social media and online outreach, which culminated in over 80 million exposures. CDC also coordinated with HHS and the Flu.gov web site and posted communication toolkits for the 2009-2010 influenza season for businesses, employers, childcare groups and institutions of higher education.

The CDC 2009 H1N1 influenza and seasonal influenza vaccination campaign was made up of multiple outreach efforts including placement of articles geared to numerous audiences like parents and young adults, in high-profile media outlets. Article placements led to nearly 403 million overall impressions. Other national outreach efforts made via social media tools, radio ads, two television public service announcements (PSAs), online media banners, and city bus ads. Numerous print materials in multiple languages were made for partners to distribute and were downloaded tens of thousands of times. Special audiences identified for additional print materials included Native Americans, African Americans, Hispanics, pregnant women, young adults, first responders, and health care workers.

In addition to materials provided for the 2009 H1N1 and seasonal influenza vaccination campaign, CDC provided other key materials in multiple languages. For example, the entire English-language 2009 H1N1 web site was mirrored in Spanish. In addition, key tools and resources were created in Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, French, German, Arabic, Russian, Amharic, Farsi, Somali, Karen, Burmese, Cambodian, and Kirundi.

In all, between April 2009 when 2009 H1N1 flu first emerged and April 2010, CDC held 60 related media events – 39 press briefings and 22 telebriefings – for a total of more than 35,000 participants. CDC also hosted its first ever two-day workshop for the news media on the subjects of both 2009 H1N1 influenza and seasonal influenza in late August. Originally conceived to include 12 members of the news media, the attendance grew to over 40 journalists from national, regional and local news outlets representing radio, television, newspapers, magazines, and online news media. Speakers at the event included the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the CDC Director, influenza experts, vaccine safety experts, and laboratory experts. The CDC hotline (1-800-CDC-INFO) responded to more than 211,000 related inquiries from the general public and health care providers, and the CDC 2009 H1N1 web site had more than 219,595,000 page views. Also, the number of CDC Facebook fans rose to more than 55,000 fans and the CDC emergency profile on Twitter was tracked by more than 1,200,000 followers."

Originally Posted by bb1961

The LSM and all our leftwing friends on this board have gone apoplectic on this "DIRE HEALTH CONCERN"...where were their concerns in 2009??

Figures don't lie, But liars figure...



In April 2009, H1N1 Became a Pandemic; 6 Months Later, After 1,000 U.S. Deaths, Obama Finally Declared it a Public Health Emergency

Posted at 3:30 pm on March 1, 2020 by Elizabeth Vaughn

Former US President Barack Obama attends a town hall meeting at the ‘European School For Management And Technology’ (ESMT) in Berlin, Germany, Saturday, April 6, 2019. (AP Photo/Michael Sohn)

In April 2009, H1N1 (the swine flu) was first detected in the U.S. According to the CDC, this “virus was a unique combination of influenza virus genes never previously identified in either animals or people.” Sounds almost like the descriptions we’ve been hearing of the coronavirus.

It began to spread immediately and President Obama addressed Americans briefly (1:27) at the end of April. He said that U.S. health officials were monitoring the situation. He recommended that if a student becomes infected, his or her school should consider closing down temporarily to contain the disease. Obama said he had requested $1.5 billion from Congress to support the government’s efforts. Finally, he called on Americans to take the same precautions they would to prevent any other flu. “Wash your hands, cover your mouth when you cough. Stay home from work if you’re sick.” And he assured us the government would do whatever it takes to keep Americans safe.
I don’t think House Speaker Nancy Pelosi or then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid accused him of not asking for enough money. And I’d be willing to bet no one accused him of not doing enough to keep Americans safe.
They had far more important things on their mind at the time. They were preoccupied with passing The Affordable Care Act in the spring of 2009 and the swine flu was an unwanted distraction.
By October, Dr. Thomas Frieden, director of the CDC told CNN, “millions of people in the United States have been infected, at least 20,000 have been hospitalized and more than 1,000 have died.”

President Obama finally declared H1N1 a public health emergency on October 24, 2009. He issued a statement which read, “The 2009 H1N1 pandemic continues to evolve. The rates of illness continue to rise rapidly within many communities across the nation, and the potential exists for the pandemic to overburden health care resources in some localities. Thus, in recognition of the continuing progression of the pandemic, and in further preparation as a nation, we are taking additional steps to facilitate our response.”
On November 12, 2009, the CDC reported an estimated 22 million Americans had been infected with H1N1 and 4,000 Americans had died.
Fast forward to 2020. China first reported the coronavirus to the World Health Organization on December 31, 2019.
According to the American Journal of Clinical Pathology:

On December 30, 2019, scientists in China “a cluster of patients with pneumonia of unknown etiology was observed in Wuhan, China, and reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) China bureau in Beijing. A week later, January 7, 2020, a new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) was isolated from these patients.”

On January 31, 2020, President Trump declared a public health emergency. USA Today reported that “quarantines of Americans who have recently been to certain parts of China” had been set up, “the first quarantine order issued by the federal government in over 50 years.”
Among the other steps taken:

[The government] began restricting U.S. access to non-citizens from China. Flights filled with U.S. citizens who were in Wuhan were brought to America and those people were quarantined on U.S. military bases for two weeks.
U.S. citizens who have been in China’s Hubei province during the past 14 days and are returning to the U.S. States will undergo health screenings and be monitored during mandatory quarantines of up to 14 days, officials said.
[Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex] Azar also announced a temporary suspension of entry into the United States of foreign nationals who pose a risk for the transmission of the coronavirus.
All flights from China to the U.S. will be funneled to one of seven airports that are designated ports of entry: New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Chicago and Atlanta.

The Trump Administration took decisive action to minimize the impact of the coronavirus in the first month. The disease had been declared a public health emergency one month before the first U.S. death. Despite the unwarranted criticism coming from the left, the government appears to be focused on protecting Americans.
When asked what more the Trump Administration could be doing, Democrats have no real answers. But that doesn’t stop them. Late last week, a New Democratic talking point was heard. CNN’s Brian Stelter wasn’t smart enough to originate it, but as always, he’s happy to tow the party line.
He sent out the following tweet: “Since the dawn of the Trump era, countless experts have warned that the president’s lack of credibility would imperil the country in the event of an emergency. As the coronavirus outbreak worsens, those fears may be coming true…”
Never at a loss for words and tired of the Democrats’ BS, James Woods called Stelter a “Helium-voiced little b*tch.”

What could trump have done better? He could shut the fuck up and let the people who know what the deal is to talk. And Pence isn't one of them.

trump is trying to whip together teams he should already have.

Thursday, as the U.S. was facing its first possible case of community-spread coronavirus, President Donald Trump brought in a long-time public health official to help manage the White House response to the spread of deadly disease. Ambassador Debbie Birx, a physician and the State Department’s top official on the global effort to reduce HIV/AIDS, will report to Vice President Mike Pence, who Trump put in charge of U.S. efforts to stem the virus in a impromptu press briefing on Wednesday.

The move was part of a push back from the Trump Administration this week after markets plummeted and critics have said they are not prepared for the disease’s seemingly inevitable landing in the U.S. In addition to bringing Dr. Birx into the White House, Pence also beefed up his team by adding Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, U.S. Surgeon General Dr. Jerome Adams, and Trump’s top economic advisor Larry Kudlow.

But many top positions across the government that could play a role in coordinating the government’s efforts to prepare for coronavirus remain empty. Birx’s appointment was necessary in part because Trump had eliminated a National Security Council office dedicated to managing pandemics in May 2018. Other key roles at the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services are being carried out by temporary, unconfirmed officials.
The long list of vacancies and scramble to bring in expertise fit a pattern of neglect in this Administration’s health security staffing that experts worry has left the U.S. on shaky ground as the coronavirus crisis gathers force. The President has said he has taken a cue from the business world by keeping agencies streamlined, but others warn that building a crisis team overnight is not how outbreaks are fought.
While it is hard to say at this stage how exactly the vacancies could impact the Trump administration’s response, it does mean that all of those people in acting roles “now trying to do multiple jobs at once,” Dr. Rebecca Katz, the director of the Center for Global Health Science and Security at Georgetown University, told TIME. These agencies can’t be staffed up overnight in an emergency, she says. “Public health capacity is something that needs to be built and sustained over time.”

There is a long list of seats that have been not been permanently filled or even had someone nominated. The United States Agency for International Development, which has faced drastic budget cuts under the Trump administration, has no nominees for key roles that would be relevant to coordinating the response to the outbreak, including Assistant Administrator for Global Health, Associate Administrator for Relief, Response, and Resilience, Assistant Administrator for Asia and Associate Administrator for Strategy and Operations. Those jobs are being handled by officials acting in a temporary capacity.

The VA’s Under Secretary for Health position, which has communicated preparedness of VA medical facilities across the country in previous health crises, has also been vacant since Trump took office. The VA’s role in the coronavirus outbreak could become even larger given the rotation of deployed service members in countries already impacted by the virus. On Tuesday, a 23-year-old American soldier stationed in South Korea became the first U.S. service member to test positive for the virus.
The State Department’s thinned down ranks also have left empty positions that would work on threat reduction and coordination with other countries in this crisis. There is, for instance, no nominee for the important role of Assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs. There are more than two dozen ambassadorships without permanent nominees, including Japan, Singapore and Pakistan.

At the Department of Homeland Security, almost all top jobs are being carried out in a temporary, unconfirmed capacity. The DHS Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Undersecretary for Management, head of Customs and Border Protection and key roles at the Federal Emergency Management Agency — all of whom are involved in the coronavirus preparation and response — are all working in an acting capacity. At Health and Human Services, which is at the forefront of the coronavirus response, the roles of Assistant secretary for planning and evaluation and Assistant secretary for financial resources are being carried out in an acting capacity. The agency also does not have an inspector general nominee.
It’s a pattern that extends all the way down to lesser-known bodies and roles, such as the currently unfilled positions for director and deputy director of the National Science Foundation, which distributes more than $8 billion in research grants including, in 2014, a number of rapid response research grants to advance Ebola research.

Within the White House itself, Trump eliminated key positions tasked with preparing and responding to outbreaks like coronavirus. This was part of a broader effort, still underway, to streamline the National Security Council and reduce the headcount of career officials from agencies detailed to the White House. Trump’s allies felt there were too many layers of bureaucracy and the large staff posed a heightened risk of leaks.

The top White House official charged with leading the U.S. response to a global pandemic, Rear Adm. Timothy Ziemer, abruptly left the administration in May 2018, when then-national security advisor John Bolton reorganized the National Security Council. The global health security team he led – created in 2016 to address the issues revealed by the slow, uncoordinated U.S. response to the Ebola crisis – was also disbanded.

By dismantling the office, “they actively unlearned a key lesson” from the U.S. response to the Ebola virus entering the country in 2014, says Jeremy Konyndyk, who served in the Obama Administration from 2013 to 2017 as the director of USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). “That was a major mistake,” he says. “The institutional memory that was there is gone. Now they are behind the eight ball and retrying to reconstitute that” by naming Pence and bringing Birx over from the State Department, says Konyndyk.
White House homeland security adviser Tom Bossert, who had been a vocal advocate for a comprehensive biodefense strategy against deadly pandemics, had left a few months earlier. According to current and former officials, those positions were not reinstated. However, the National Biodefense Strategy, which Bossert and his colleagues spearheaded in 2018, remains the roadmap the U.S. officials are using today.

“A lot of the benefits that the American public is reaping today comes from the work of public health community under the Trump administration that resulted in a biodefense strategy, and from the capacity in our health security system that has been built upon over the last decade under two presidents,” Bossert told TIME.

The National Biodefense Strategy moved the “day-to-day coordination and execution” of the plan from national security officials in the White House to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, a move some health security experts worry that the coronavirus crisis is about to test.

“We are in an era of more frequent outbreaks — of higher velocity, higher impact, higher cost — and we need to be much better prepared in order to have an effective and timely response,” said Steve Morrison, the director of the CSIS global health center and a former State Department official who served in the Clinton administration. “There needs to be strong White House leadership. You can’t expect that the Secretary of HHS is going to be able to get the same level of influence [in] the State Department, the Defense Department.”

Morrison recently led a two-year CSIS commission on U.S. pandemic preparedness which included six members of Congress, health experts, and former U.S. and military officials. The group published a report in November warning that they were “sounding the alarm that the U.S. government is caught in a cycle of crisis and complacency” when it comes to preparing for global pandemics.

As its very first recommendation, the commission urged the White House to restore health security leadership at the NSC. So far, Trump officials do not appear to have gotten the memo."

https://time.com/5792015/trump-coronavirus-vacancies/

trump has repeatedly confused the issue. He talks about "hunches" and other bullshit. His 16000 + lies have left no credibility for him with non-trumpys.
He has alienated a majority of the country, long before corona.

[The_Waco_Kid]

Originally Posted by Munchmasterman

Liars lie. Which you did right off the bat.

The pandemic was declared in June, not April 2009.

Where was the concern in 2009?
You make the sweeping and ignorant statement about H1N1 concern with no information whatsoever.
You were a member of ECCIE in the 1st year of the H1F1 epidemic......but you didn't post anything until 2017. There was no concern mentioned on your part.

Compare and contrast?
To the info in your link?

Here is a much better link.

https://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm#top

Compare and contrast?

Pence is the official info outlet. A non-scientific bottleneck. That is a political response, not a scientific response.

In 2009, the response is detailed in a section I included from the link below.

In 2009, CDC, WHO, and other scientific orgs kept us informed.
In 2020, trump (a non-scientific moron at best) is trying to get re-elected. Enough said.

The first case was identified on Apr. 15, 2009.

"On September 15, 2009, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced its approval of four 2009 H1N1 influenza vaccinesExternal Web Site Icon, and later, on November 16, FDA announced its approval of a fifth 2009 H1N1 vaccineExternal Web Site Icon to protect against the 2009 H1N1 flu virus."

And it doesn't matter when Obama declared anything. His was a status change, not an increase in threat.
Obama wasn't talking over or contradicting CDC or WHO.
WHO declared a pandemic 2 months after the FIRST case was discovered.

The linked article is long and includes lots of details trumpys ignore.
The devil is in the details.

"CDC Laboratories Bolster Nation’s Testing Capacity
While initial efforts were underway to develop a safe and effective vaccine to protect people against 2009 H1N1, work also was being done at CDC to help laboratories supporting health care professionals to more quickly identify the 2009 H1N1 virus in samples from patients. The real-time PCR test developed by CDC was cleared for use by diagnostic laboratories by FDA under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) on April 28, 2009, less than two weeks after identification of the new pandemic virus. Prior to the availability of this EUA, public health laboratories had been able to identify whether influenza A viruses were seasonal influenza viruses or were a novel strain, but the new diagnostic kits allowed labs to confirm a virus as 2009 H1N1. On May 1, 2009, CDC test kits began shipping to domestic and international public health laboratories. (Each test kit contained reagents to test 1,000 clinical specimens). From May 1 through September 1, 2009, more than 1,000 kits were shipped to 120 domestic and 250 international laboratories in 140 countries. Once labs had the test kits and verified that their testing was running properly, they were able to identify new cases more quickly than before and no longer needed to send samples to CDC for lab confirmation. The transition away from CDC lab confirmation testing didn’t happen overnight though - between April 23 and May 31, 2009, CDC influenza laboratory analyzed about 5,000 influenza virus samples, five times the number that were processed in a similar timeframe in 2008, and more than during any previous influenza season. By May 18, 2009, 40 states had been validated to conduct their own 2009 H1N1 testing, with eight states having multiple laboratories able to do their own testing. CDC alerted the public that the expansion in testing capacity would likely result in a jump in the number of 2009 H1N1 cases, but that this would actually present a more accurate picture of the true scope of 2009 H1N1 influenza in the United States"

"A Pandemic is Declared
On June 11, 2009, WHO signaled that a global pandemic of 2009 H1N1 influenza was underwayExternal Web Site Icon by further raising the worldwide pandemic alert level to Phase 6External Web Site IconExternal Web Site Icon. That day, CDC held its first press conference with the new CDC Director Thomas Frieden, MD, MPH. The press conference had a total of 2,355 participants. At the time, more than 70 countries had reported cases of 2009 H1N1 infection, and community level outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 were ongoing in multiple parts of the world. The WHO decision to raise the pandemic alert level to Phase 6 was a reflection of spread of the virus in other parts of the world and not a reflection of any change in the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus or associated illness. To date, most people in the United States who had become ill with 2009 H1N1 influenza had not become seriously ill and had recovered without hospitalization."

Here is an important section.


"CDC Communication Activities During the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
The CDC response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was led by science and continually evolved to meet the nation’s needs as events unfolded and as more information became available. However, a consistent underlying communications strategy underscored the entire CDC response. The strategy is based on the emergency risk communications principles of quickly, proactively and transparently communicating accurate information to the public and to partners. This strategy included CDC clearly stating its goals and actions in response to the evolving situation and acknowledging what was not known, as well as what was known. Another important part of the strategy was CDC setting the expectation that information and advice would change rapidly as the situation evolved. From the earliest days of the pandemic, CDC regularly articulated its goals to “reduce transmission and illness severity, and provide information to help health care providers, public health officials and the public address the challenges posed by the new virus.” Throughout the response, in an effort to provide the most helpful information in the most effective ways possible, CDC drew on existing knowledge but also worked with partners to conduct ongoing scientific research and evaluation of people’s knowledge, attitudes and practices related to a number of topics including 2009 H1N1 flu, infection control guidance, and vaccine.

Especially during the early days of the outbreak, the release of information from CDC and exchange of information with partners was conducted on a 24-hour cycle. This included frequent updates to media and the public, the consistent use of a core group of spokespersons, daily information outreach to partners, and rapid establishment and ongoing maintenance of an extensive Web site dedicated specifically to the emergency response for 2009 H1N1 flu. The goal was not only to be as transparent as possible in all activities related to managing the public health response, but also to maintain credibility and continue to be a trusted source of information for the public and for partners.

Beginning early in the response and continuing throughout the year and into 2010, special care was taken to keep state and local public health partners informed of CDC’s activities. Key messages were regularly provided to help maintain consistent, clear communication across the response. Special care also was taken to regularly collect feedback from state and local public health partners to help ensure that CDC recommendations were finely tuned to what was happening in the field. Regularly scheduled conference calls with the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, the National Association of City and County Health Officials, and the National Public Health Information Coalition proved to be an effective way to share information. In addition, on April 24, 2009, CDC held the first of more than 30 Clinician Outreach and Communication Activity (COCA) calls presented on a variety of 2009 H1N1-related topics. COCA is designed to reach a diverse group of health care providers and provide a system through which clinicians can communicate their educational needs to CDC and receive answers to questions about related emerging diseases. At the peak of the 2009 H1N1 response, COCA had more than 41,100 listserv subscribers.

CDC also worked hard to keep the policy community informed. CDC provided responses to congressional requests for information and briefings on 2009 H1N1-related issues, and also provided email and web-based informational updates as the pandemic unfolded. In all, CDC participated in 14 hearings, provided technical assistance in another 12 hearings, issued over three dozen 2009 H1N1 newsletters to policymakers, arranged for over 40 congressional briefings or speaking engagements and fielded over 350 congressional inquiries during the pandemic.

There was a concerted effort to get information out as soon as possible and to keep the public and partners aware of developments as they unfolded, even as guidance was changing quickly. For example, when relatively few cases of human infection with this virus were lab confirmed and severity of the pandemic was not known, on April 28, 2009, CDC posted guidance for schools and advised that they close if they had a suspected or actual case of the flu in order to lessen the risk of spreading 2009 H1N1 into their communities. As more information became available suggesting a lower risk of severe illness and death from 2009 H1N1, six days later the recommendation was changed to recommend against school closure for community mitigation purposes.

The development of CDC guidance is an example of the collaborative communication and sharing of information that took place between CDC, HHS, other federal agencies, and external partners. Development of appropriate guidance often relied on CDC communication with many external partners several times a week, with the goal of achieving consensus on what the best practice would be given the best science currently available. For example, CDC worked with representatives from a number of organizations including but not limited to Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE),External Web Site Icon National Association of County and City Health Officials (NAACHO), External Web Site IconAmerican Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)External Web Site Icon, American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)External Web Site Icon, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), External Web Site IconAssociation of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO)External Web Site Icon, American College of Physicians (ACP)External Web Site Icon, Infectious Diseases Society of America (ISDA)External Web Site Icon, American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)External Web Site Icon, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) External Web Site Iconand World Health Organization (WHO)External Web Site Icon, during the development of guidance related to everything from surveillance systems to the appropriate use of antiviral drugs during the pandemic. On the topic of vaccination, these discussions helped inform decision-making by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).

Apart from ongoing collaboration between CDC and its external partners, the communications response for 2009 H1N1 flu also was characterized by ongoing, close coordination between CDC’s communicators and its scientists to ensure that messages stayed scientifically accurate. Also, CDC communicators took time to regularly analyze feedback from a variety of external sources, including polls and surveys, in order to ensure that CDC's messages were clear.

CDC provided a steady stream of information to audiences across the spectrum: from the public to pharmacists to laboratorians to international partners and countries around the globe. Information provided by CDC reached a myriad of audiences through a variety of channels including but not limited to: a 24-hour information hotline, press briefings for the media, dissemination through health alert networks, daily postings (including video and audio podcasts) to the CDC 2009 H1N1 web site, regular updates on Facebook and Twitter, and further outreach by partners and partner organizations to their own audiences, just to name a few channels. For example, in November 2009, CDC kicked off a national travelers’ health public awareness campaign and urged travelers to plan ahead and stay informed about what to do if they got sick while they were away from home. The campaign used a variety of media, including informational posters distributed at over 300 ports of entry in the United States, national radio and print advertising, and social media and online outreach, which culminated in over 80 million exposures. CDC also coordinated with HHS and the Flu.gov web site and posted communication toolkits for the 2009-2010 influenza season for businesses, employers, childcare groups and institutions of higher education.

The CDC 2009 H1N1 influenza and seasonal influenza vaccination campaign was made up of multiple outreach efforts including placement of articles geared to numerous audiences like parents and young adults, in high-profile media outlets. Article placements led to nearly 403 million overall impressions. Other national outreach efforts made via social media tools, radio ads, two television public service announcements (PSAs), online media banners, and city bus ads. Numerous print materials in multiple languages were made for partners to distribute and were downloaded tens of thousands of times. Special audiences identified for additional print materials included Native Americans, African Americans, Hispanics, pregnant women, young adults, first responders, and health care workers.

In addition to materials provided for the 2009 H1N1 and seasonal influenza vaccination campaign, CDC provided other key materials in multiple languages. For example, the entire English-language 2009 H1N1 web site was mirrored in Spanish. In addition, key tools and resources were created in Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, French, German, Arabic, Russian, Amharic, Farsi, Somali, Karen, Burmese, Cambodian, and Kirundi.

In all, between April 2009 when 2009 H1N1 flu first emerged and April 2010, CDC held 60 related media events – 39 press briefings and 22 telebriefings – for a total of more than 35,000 participants. CDC also hosted its first ever two-day workshop for the news media on the subjects of both 2009 H1N1 influenza and seasonal influenza in late August. Originally conceived to include 12 members of the news media, the attendance grew to over 40 journalists from national, regional and local news outlets representing radio, television, newspapers, magazines, and online news media. Speakers at the event included the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the CDC Director, influenza experts, vaccine safety experts, and laboratory experts. The CDC hotline (1-800-CDC-INFO) responded to more than 211,000 related inquiries from the general public and health care providers, and the CDC 2009 H1N1 web site had more than 219,595,000 page views. Also, the number of CDC Facebook fans rose to more than 55,000 fans and the CDC emergency profile on Twitter was tracked by more than 1,200,000 followers."



What could trump have done better? He could shut the fuck up and let the people who know what the deal is to talk. And Pence isn't one of them.

trump is trying to whip together teams he should already have.

Thursday, as the U.S. was facing its first possible case of community-spread coronavirus, President Donald Trump brought in a long-time public health official to help manage the White House response to the spread of deadly disease. Ambassador Debbie Birx, a physician and the State Department’s top official on the global effort to reduce HIV/AIDS, will report to Vice President Mike Pence, who Trump put in charge of U.S. efforts to stem the virus in a impromptu press briefing on Wednesday.

The move was part of a push back from the Trump Administration this week after markets plummeted and critics have said they are not prepared for the disease’s seemingly inevitable landing in the U.S. In addition to bringing Dr. Birx into the White House, Pence also beefed up his team by adding Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, U.S. Surgeon General Dr. Jerome Adams, and Trump’s top economic advisor Larry Kudlow.

But many top positions across the government that could play a role in coordinating the government’s efforts to prepare for coronavirus remain empty. Birx’s appointment was necessary in part because Trump had eliminated a National Security Council office dedicated to managing pandemics in May 2018. Other key roles at the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services are being carried out by temporary, unconfirmed officials.
The long list of vacancies and scramble to bring in expertise fit a pattern of neglect in this Administration’s health security staffing that experts worry has left the U.S. on shaky ground as the coronavirus crisis gathers force. The President has said he has taken a cue from the business world by keeping agencies streamlined, but others warn that building a crisis team overnight is not how outbreaks are fought.
While it is hard to say at this stage how exactly the vacancies could impact the Trump administration’s response, it does mean that all of those people in acting roles “now trying to do multiple jobs at once,” Dr. Rebecca Katz, the director of the Center for Global Health Science and Security at Georgetown University, told TIME. These agencies can’t be staffed up overnight in an emergency, she says. “Public health capacity is something that needs to be built and sustained over time.”

There is a long list of seats that have been not been permanently filled or even had someone nominated. The United States Agency for International Development, which has faced drastic budget cuts under the Trump administration, has no nominees for key roles that would be relevant to coordinating the response to the outbreak, including Assistant Administrator for Global Health, Associate Administrator for Relief, Response, and Resilience, Assistant Administrator for Asia and Associate Administrator for Strategy and Operations. Those jobs are being handled by officials acting in a temporary capacity.

The VA’s Under Secretary for Health position, which has communicated preparedness of VA medical facilities across the country in previous health crises, has also been vacant since Trump took office. The VA’s role in the coronavirus outbreak could become even larger given the rotation of deployed service members in countries already impacted by the virus. On Tuesday, a 23-year-old American soldier stationed in South Korea became the first U.S. service member to test positive for the virus.
The State Department’s thinned down ranks also have left empty positions that would work on threat reduction and coordination with other countries in this crisis. There is, for instance, no nominee for the important role of Assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs. There are more than two dozen ambassadorships without permanent nominees, including Japan, Singapore and Pakistan.

At the Department of Homeland Security, almost all top jobs are being carried out in a temporary, unconfirmed capacity. The DHS Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Undersecretary for Management, head of Customs and Border Protection and key roles at the Federal Emergency Management Agency — all of whom are involved in the coronavirus preparation and response — are all working in an acting capacity. At Health and Human Services, which is at the forefront of the coronavirus response, the roles of Assistant secretary for planning and evaluation and Assistant secretary for financial resources are being carried out in an acting capacity. The agency also does not have an inspector general nominee.
It’s a pattern that extends all the way down to lesser-known bodies and roles, such as the currently unfilled positions for director and deputy director of the National Science Foundation, which distributes more than $8 billion in research grants including, in 2014, a number of rapid response research grants to advance Ebola research.

Within the White House itself, Trump eliminated key positions tasked with preparing and responding to outbreaks like coronavirus. This was part of a broader effort, still underway, to streamline the National Security Council and reduce the headcount of career officials from agencies detailed to the White House. Trump’s allies felt there were too many layers of bureaucracy and the large staff posed a heightened risk of leaks.

The top White House official charged with leading the U.S. response to a global pandemic, Rear Adm. Timothy Ziemer, abruptly left the administration in May 2018, when then-national security advisor John Bolton reorganized the National Security Council. The global health security team he led – created in 2016 to address the issues revealed by the slow, uncoordinated U.S. response to the Ebola crisis – was also disbanded.

By dismantling the office, “they actively unlearned a key lesson” from the U.S. response to the Ebola virus entering the country in 2014, says Jeremy Konyndyk, who served in the Obama Administration from 2013 to 2017 as the director of USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). “That was a major mistake,” he says. “The institutional memory that was there is gone. Now they are behind the eight ball and retrying to reconstitute that” by naming Pence and bringing Birx over from the State Department, says Konyndyk.
White House homeland security adviser Tom Bossert, who had been a vocal advocate for a comprehensive biodefense strategy against deadly pandemics, had left a few months earlier. According to current and former officials, those positions were not reinstated. However, the National Biodefense Strategy, which Bossert and his colleagues spearheaded in 2018, remains the roadmap the U.S. officials are using today.

“A lot of the benefits that the American public is reaping today comes from the work of public health community under the Trump administration that resulted in a biodefense strategy, and from the capacity in our health security system that has been built upon over the last decade under two presidents,” Bossert told TIME.

The National Biodefense Strategy moved the “day-to-day coordination and execution” of the plan from national security officials in the White House to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, a move some health security experts worry that the coronavirus crisis is about to test.

“We are in an era of more frequent outbreaks — of higher velocity, higher impact, higher cost — and we need to be much better prepared in order to have an effective and timely response,” said Steve Morrison, the director of the CSIS global health center and a former State Department official who served in the Clinton administration. “There needs to be strong White House leadership. You can’t expect that the Secretary of HHS is going to be able to get the same level of influence [in] the State Department, the Defense Department.”

Morrison recently led a two-year CSIS commission on U.S. pandemic preparedness which included six members of Congress, health experts, and former U.S. and military officials. The group published a report in November warning that they were “sounding the alarm that the U.S. government is caught in a cycle of crisis and complacency” when it comes to preparing for global pandemics.

As its very first recommendation, the commission urged the White House to restore health security leadership at the NSC. So far, Trump officials do not appear to have gotten the memo."

https://time.com/5792015/trump-coronavirus-vacancies/

trump has repeatedly confused the issue. He talks about "hunches" and other bullshit. His 16000 + lies have left no credibility for him with non-trumpys.
He has alienated a majority of the country, long before corona.

too long didn't read. stop drinking at 3:30 am sober up yous loser.
BAHHAHHAAAAAAAA

[WTF]

Originally Posted by The_Waco_Kid

too long didn't read. stop drinking at 3:30 am sober up yous loser.
BAHHAHHAAAAAAAA

Is that your go to response when the facts do not fit your narrative? Sober up?

[Munchmasterman]

Being too long never stopped you from putting a dick in your mouth.

And isn't it ironic that a guy who accuses everyone who posts something he doesn't like of being a drinker has a screen name of a famous alcoholic? Like I've said many times. When you have nothing to say you go with what you know.

My statement, "The linked article is long and includes lots of details trumpys ignore.
The devil is in the details." was only a 20 second read from the top.

To sum up, you didn't read the article because you don't have time to educate yourself (something well known on the forum). Because you didn't read it you made the asshole assumption I'd been drinking before I posted.
A true uneducated trumpy. You "know" what you "know" and don't know anything else.

On top of not knowing anything about the post or having the desire to learn anything about the subject of the thread, you felt compelled to let everyone know you didn't know anything about the subject.
What a douche-bag.

Originally Posted by The_Waco_Kid

too long didn't read. stop drinking at 3:30 am sober up yous loser.
BAHHAHHAAAAAAAA

Pretty easy to tell who is drinking. The guy who can't write complete sentences, thoughts and throws in a time well after my post was made